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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION-THE BURDEN-SHIFTING
ANALYSIS IN A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-
THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS CHANGES
THE SUPREME COURT'S BURDEN OF PRODUCTION ON
A DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF NON-DISCRIMINATION:
SIMMONS V. AMERICAN AIRLINES
LuKE E. ALVERSON*
K MID CONCERNS of plaintiff difficulty in producing direct
1 vidence of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a "burden-shifting analysis" in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green' to alleviate such problems.2 This analysis-originally de-
rived for employment discrimination and later applied to other
discrimination scenarios3 -requires a defendant to articulate le-
gitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions in re-
sponse to a plaintiffs valid complaint of discrimination.4 In the
recent case of Simmons v. American Airlines, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the burden-shifting analysis to an issue
of racial discrimination, overturning a district court grant of
summary judgment.5 Though the use of the burden-shifting
analysis was proper, the court improperly placed an emphasis
on the persuasiveness and subjective credibility, rather than the
legal sufficiency, of the defendant's evidence of non-discrimina-
tion. As this article will discuss, this emphasis incorrectly in-
* Candidate for J.D., 2004, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law; B.B.A., 2000, Abilene Christian University.
I See infta note 20.
2 See Matthew D. O'Leary, St. Mary's v. Hicks: The Supreme Court Restricts the Indi-
rect Method of Proof in Title VII Claims, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 821, 824-27
(1994).
3 E.g., Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mort. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 710-11
(Cal. App. 1994) (applying McDonnell to a case involving racial discrimination in
mortgage approval).
4 Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
5 Simmons v. Am. Airlines, 2000 WL 33529791, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2000).
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creases the defendant's evidentiary burden as well as eases the
plaintiff's ability to maintain a baseless racial discrimination suit.
On August 19, 1999, Raymond Simmons, an African-Ameri-
can man, boarded American Airlines ("American") flight 1726,
bound for Tampa, Florida.5 Some time before take-off, an un-
identified female passenger seated in front of Mr. Simmons
complained to the flight attendants that he was using obscene
language while on his cell phone, specifically the phrase, "damn
white bitch."7 The captain was informed of the situation and
requested that the flight attendants remove Mr. Simmons for
the protection of the other passengers." Mr. Simmons was then
asked by the flight attendants, without explanation, to retrieve
his carry-on bag and get off the airplane.
9 While being escorted
off the airplane and into the airport terminal, Mr. Simmons
made remarks about not being a hijacker, and was told of the
reason for his removal.' Later that day, Mr. Simmons was per-
mitted to board a flight to Tampa."1
Subsequent to the incident, American Airlines personnel
completed an incident report describing the events.'
2 The re-
port summarized the incident, noting that a passenger was
"shaken up" due to Mr. Simmons's use of "obscene" language,
and that the captain ordered Mr. Simmons removed to "guaran-
tee the safety of the other p[assengers]."1 3 In the "event note
details" portion of the report, the obscenities used by Mr. Sim-
mons were identified, along with the "I am not going to hijack"
statement."4
Several months after the incident, Mr. Simmons filed a pro se
complaint under the Unruh Civil Rights Act
1 5 against American
Airlines in California state court." Mr. Simmons alleged that he
6 Id.
7 Id. at *2.
8 Id.
9 Id. at *1.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at *1-2.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides a cause of action against "business es-
tablishments" for denial of equal "accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privi-
leges, or services" based on race, among other characteristics. CAL. 
CIV. CODE
§ 51(b) (West 2002). The statute has been interpreted to protect airline passen-
gers from discrimination on the basis of race. See Abou-Jaoude v. 
British Ailways,
281 Cal. Rptr. 150, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
16 Simmons v. Am. Airlines, 34 Fed. Appx. 573, 575 (9th Cir. 2002).
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was racially discriminated against when he was removed from
the flight, based on an unsubstantiated complaint.' 7 American
removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, stating that Mr. Simmons was removed for dis-
orderly conduct pursuant to business policy.'
The U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California
granted American's motion for summary judgment.'9 Using the
Supreme Court's three-part burden-shifting analysis for discrimi-
nation claims established in McDonnell Douglas,20 the court deter-
mined that American Airlines "articulated a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its actions and presented evidence suf-
ficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact," therefore shift-
ing the burden of proving discriminatory pretext back to Mr.
Simmons.2' Since Mr. Simmons, in the court's opinion, did not
present "specific and probative evidence" of discriminatory pre-
text, he therefore failed the third element of the McDonnell
Douglas test and did not survive American's motion for summary
judgment.22
In an opinion citing only one source, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the district court's decision.23 The Ninth
Circuit held that American offered an implausible explanation
for Mr. Simmons's removal, insufficient to shift the burden of
production back to Mr. Simmons.- Borrowing language from
Burdine, the court focused exclusively on American's perceived
failure to provide evidence "legally sufficient to justify a judg-
ment" in American's favor, ultimately keeping from Mr. Sim-
mons the burden of producing evidence that demonstrates
discriminatory pretext. 25
The Ninth Circuit based their opinion of American's prof-
fered explanation on American's apparent failure to follow its
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Simmons, 2000 WL 33529791, at *4.
20 The elements of the test, as articulated, are: (1) the complainant must estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the defendant must offer a legiti-
mate reason for his actions; and (3) the complainant must prove that the
defendant's reason was a pretext to mask an illegal motive. See McDonnell, 411
U.S. at 802-03; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56; Simmons, 2000 WL 33529791, at
*2.
21 See Simmons, 2000 WL 33529791, at *4.
22 Id.
23 Simmons, 34 Fed. Appx. at 575-77.
24 Id. at 576.
25 Id.
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own safety policy.26 The court noted specific sections of Ameri-
can's safety policy 27 and attempted to apply it to the events of
the case to determine if American's explanation was "legitimate"
under its own wording.28 Analyzing the situation in this context,
the court noted that there was no evidence of Mr. Simmons be-
ing warned before removal from the plane, and based on this
fact, the conduct was not, in their view, "misconduct" under the
American Airlines policy.29 The court ultimately determined
that since American apparently failed to follow its own self-im-
posed safety policy, the evidence of Mr. Simmons's disturbance
was not credible and therefore not legally sufficient to justify a
judgment for the defendant.30 Under such a standard, the court
held that American's evidence was not a legitimate, non-discrim-
inatory reason for removing Mr. Simmons, and was insufficient
to warrant summary judgment in its favor.3'
While the use of the burden-shifting analysis was proper, the
Ninth Circuit improperly characterized the nature of the bur-
den placed upon the defendant once the plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination. 2 The test itself
requires that once a plaintiff has met his initial requirement of
establishing a prima facie case for discrimination (the burden of
which is less than preponderance of the evidence), 33 the defen-
dant accepts a burden of rebutting the presumption of discrimi-
nation with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
action.3 4 This burden is one only of production; the burden of
persuasion never leaves the plaintiff.35 Therefore, the defen-
26 Id.
27 Section 1.16(E)(1) of the policy and relevant definitions of paragraph A
provide that passenger misconduct requiring the captain's attention may result in
removal of the passenger from the aircraft. The "misconduct" of a passenger is
further divided into three escalating categories. Category one involves a flight
attendant requesting compliance of a passenger with no further incidents and no
report to the cockpit. In category two, the disturbance continues, interfering
with cabin safety. Category three occurs when another passenger or
crewmember is injured or subjected to threat of injury, with or without warning.
Id.
28 Simmons, 34 Fed. Appx. at 575-77.
- Id. at 576.
- Id. at 577.
31 Id.
32 See id. (evaluating the credibility of the evidence proffered by American
Airlines).
33 Simmons, 2000 WL 33529791, at *1.
34 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
35 Id. at 253.
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dant "need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated
by the proffered reasons," and must only raise "a genuine issue
of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. '3 6
Once this burden is met, the plaintiff then reassumes the bur-
den of providing probative evidence of discriminatory pretext,
which in effect demonstrates that the defendant's offered rea-
sons were not truthful. 37
Much has been said of the burden of production placed on
the defendant and its improper application in such discrimina-
tion claims. In an article for the St. Louis University Public Law
Review, the Burdine articulation of McDonnell Douglas was dis-
cussed, specifically the fact that while a defendant must offer
legally sufficient reasons to justify a judgment in its favor, it is
improper to evaluate the reason's credibility at that stage 8.3  To
evaluate credibility at this initial burden-shifting stage would be
to improperly raise the defendant's burden beyond that of pro-
duction. 39 The California Court of Appeals for the Fourth Dis-
trict, in the case of Rancho Santa Margarita, reiterated the
Supreme Court's concern regarding the incorrect application of
the defendant's burden.a By elevating the defendant's burden
through allowing a court to reject poor reasons for a defen-
dant's action, even though non-discriminatory, the plaintiff
could improperly avoid presenting probative evidence of that
discrimination .4 t
Looking no further than the opinion in Burnett, an expression
of concern can be found regarding application of an improper
36 Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25
(1987)).
37 Id. at 256; see also Schuler v. Chronicle Broad. Co., 793 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th
Cir. 1986) (stating that for a plaintiff to withstand a defendant's motion for sum-
maryjudgrnent in a discrimination suit, the plaintiff must offer specific and sig-
nificantly probative evidence that the alleged purpose of the defendant was a
pretext for discrimination).
38 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; O'Leary, supra note 2, at 824-27 (discussing
the three-part burden-shifting analysis under McDonnell, as clarified in Burdine, at
the time of the first burden-shift).
39 See supra note 38.
40 Rancho Santa Margarita, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710-11; see also St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) ("[N]othing in law would permit us to substi-
tute for the required finding that the [defendant's] action was the product of
unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the
[defendant's] explanation of its action was not believable.").
41 Rancho Santa Margarita, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710-11.
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standard for the defendant.4 2 In criticizing a ruling of the Fifth
Circuit, the Supreme Court explains:
[T]he [defendant's] burden is satisfied if he simply 'explains
what he has done' or 'produces evidence of legitimate non-dis-
criminatory reasons.' It is clear that the Court of Appeals re-
quired much more: it placed on the defendant the burden of
persuading the court that it had convincing, objective reasons for
[acting as it did] .. .We have stated consistently that the [defen-
dant's] prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the
[defendant] articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is to
satisfy [the burden] the [defendant] need only produce admissi-
ble evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to con-
clude that the [action] has not been motivated by discriminatory
animus.
43
The Court concluded that in demanding more than this, the
Fifth Circuit was incorrectly requiring the defendant to per-
suade the trier of fact that its actions were non-discriminatory,
rather than simply satisfying a burden of production.4 4
The Ninth Circuit's application of American's own safety pol-
icy to the facts of Simmons incorrectly resulted in American Air-
lines being required to bear a burden of persuasion as to the
legitimacy and credibility of its non-discriminatory reasons. Be-
ginning its analysis of the burden-shifting structure, the court
stated that the test does not give American Airlines "carte
blanche to proffer any explanation, regardless of plausibil-
ity... to shift the burden back to Simmons," and focuses on the
"legally sufficient" language of Burdine to establish the legal stan-
dard.45 While this language is in the correct context, the court
erroneously looks to American's in-flight safety policy as an eval-
uation tool of the evidence's credibility in an attempt to estab-
lish (or perhaps discredit) the "legal sufficiency" of American's
evidence, completely ignoring the standard established by the
Supreme Court.
As explained by the Court in Burdine, "legally sufficient" refers
only to the admissibility of the defendant's evidence and its pos-
sibility of allowing rational triers of fact to conclude that there
was no discriminatory intent; an evaluation of credibility has no
place in the analysis at this point.4 6 Notwithstanding American's
42 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.
43 Id. (citations omitted).
44 Id.
45 Simmons, 34 Fed. Appx. at 576.
46 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.
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valid argument that the safety policy only applies while aircraft is
in-flight (not, as in this case, while on the tarmac), the court did
not discuss the significance of following the safety policy in a
discriminatory context, much less provide a legal basis for using
the safety policy as a standard.4 7 What the court should have
done is analyze the incident report American Airlines submitted
by asking, "does this report explain, in non-discriminatory
terms, why American removed Mr. Simmons from the flight," or
"does the report raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether
American discriminated against Mr. Simmons?" Upon answer-
ing "yes" to either of these questions, the burden would properly
shift back to the plaintiff to produce probative evidence of dis-
criminatory pretext.
The Ninth Circuit's use of American's safety policy as an ob-
jective evaluator ultimately presents two problems. First, it un-
dermines the Supreme Court's requirement that the defendant
should not be forced to bear a persuasive burden in presenting
evidence.48 While this court and others may believe the reason
offered by American Airlines is poor, by either their own per-
sonal standards or American's safety policy, it is of absolutely no
consequence in determining whether American satisfied its bur-
den of legal sufficiency under the Burdine test, so long as it is
non-discriminatory and offered through admissible evidence.4 "
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the decision allowed
Mr. Simmons to effectively skip the Supreme Court's third and
arguably most important part of the burden-shifting test: the re-
butting of American's evidence of non-discrimination through
the presentation of evidence showing American's actions to be
pretext of racial discrimination.5" What is missing from Simmons
is exactly what a legitimate claim should contain-at no time did
Mr. Simmons present evidence that American Airlines had any
discriminatory purpose whatsoever. By reversing the district
court's grant of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit has effec-
tively imposed an improper burden of persuasion on defendants
47 Simmons, 34 Fed. Appx. at 575-77 n.3.
48 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256-58 (discussing the misconstruing of the test by
the Fifth Circuit and the rationale behind not requiring persuasion from the
defendant).
49 See id.; see also Rancho Santa Margarita, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711 (discussing the
problems of evaluating defendant's explanation in the burden-shifting analysis).
50 See supra note 48; see also Schuler, 793 F.2d at 1011 ("To withstand an em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment in a discrimination suit, the employee
must do more than establish a prima facie case and deny the credibility of the
[defendant's] witnesses.").
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in racial discrimination suits, which not only creates difficulty
for defendants in rebutting baseless claims, but further gives a
plaintiff carrying an empty shotgun of accusation undeserved
standing and significance in the legal system.
